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Aggression and perceived national face threats in Mainland Chinese and
Taiwanese CMC discussion boards
Dániel Z. Kádár, Michael Haugh and Wei-Lin Melody Chang
Abstract:
This study examines manifestations of verbal aggression in an intergroup context between
Mainland Chinese and Taiwanese on computer-mediated communication (CMC) discussion
boards. We examine the role of perceptions of national identity and face in occasioning
instances of aggression in Sino-Taiwanese online interactions. It will be argued that there is a
fundamental difference between Mainland Chinese and Taiwanese ways of displaying
aggression when discussing cross-Strait issues. While the Taiwanese use abusive terms in
order to dissociate themselves from the Mainland Chinese in online discourse, the latter tend
to associate themselves with Taiwanese through terms that subsume Taiwanese claims to a
national identity within a broader pan-Chinese identity, thereby implicitly displaying a social
claim of sovereignty and cultural supremacy over Taiwan. We argue that these differences
can be traced to evaluations by Taiwanese of these associative moves as threatening to their
perceived national face.

Keywords:
identity, face, verbal aggression, impoliteness, CMC, China, Taiwan
1. Introduction
The study of verbal aggression has in recent years garnered increasing attention in the rapidly
growing field of impoliteness research. However, this interest in aggression, rudeness and
other impoliteness-related areas has, following the general trend in politeness research,
centred primarily on its occurrence in interpersonal interaction (Bousfield 2008; Bousfield
and Locher 2008; Culpeper 1996, 2011). The study of verbal aggression or perceived
impoliteness in the context of intergroup relations, in contrast, has received less attention. The
move to studying impoliteness in various forms of computer-mediated communication (CMC)
offers the opportunity to start addressing this imbalance. Online discussion boards, for
instance, can provide a very large corpus of interactions spread across large networks of users
that enable researchers to examine verbal aggression not only at an interpersonal but also an
intergroup level of analysis. In order to examine the implications of verbal aggression and
perceptions of impoliteness for intergroup relations, however, the traditional theorisation of
face as a positive self-image attributed to individuals (Goffman 1967; Brown and Levinson
1987) needs to be complemented by a conceptualisation of face that is extensible to groups.
Such a collective notion of face need not assume an essentialistic view of group identity, but
instead can build on a discursive conceptualisation of identity as produced, enacted or
performed in discourse (Blommaert 2005; Bucholtz 1999; Butler 1990). The value of
examining perceptions of collective identities through the prism of face is that it highlights the
crucial importance of recognition of such perceptions by others in intergroup contexts.
Online nationalistic discourse in and between groups of Mainland Chinese and
Taiwanese offers a useful window into verbal aggression (and other aspects of) impoliteness
in an intergroup context. There are long-term political strains between China and Taiwan: the
Chinese Communist Party claims Taiwan is a part of China, while the Taiwanese reject this
stance (Cole 2006). Due to this, Mainland Chinese and Taiwanese online interactions can
become hostile when the two sides interact or if they discuss issues relating to national
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identity. In direct Sino-Taiwanese interactions even seemingly small issues such as the use of
simplified or traditional Chinese characters (the former preferred in China and the latter in
Taiwan) can lead to the outbreak of acrimonious debates. Such debates are arguably
connected to the broader discourse on Chinese nationalism that surfaces, for instance, in the
media in both countries (Gries 1999; Gries and Peng 2002; Kuo 2002, 2003).1
A focus on Chinese verbal aggression and impoliteness in intergroup contexts also
addresses somewhat of a gap in the field: although some studies have touched on aggression,
rudeness and other impoliteness-related areas (Kádár 2012; Pan 2000; Pan and Kádár 2011),
impoliteness in Chinese is still considerably underrepresented in the literature, compared with
politeness issues. Studies on relational work in CMC also reflect this imbalance: while
various forms of CMC offer potentially massive datasets to examine conflict, rudeness,
aggression and other phenomena associated with impoliteness, the few studies devoted to
Chinese CMC have dealt predominantly with politeness (Chen 2009; Lu 2010), and other
related phenomena (Su 2009; Wang 2009).
In this study, we examine manifestations of verbal aggression between Chinese and
Taiwanese in computer-mediated communication (CMC) discussion boards. More
specifically, we examine the role of perceptions of national identity and national face in
occasioning instances of aggression in this particular intergroup context. While we argue that
perceived threats to national face can occasion instances of verbal aggression, we propose that
national face is of a different order of ontological reality compared to that of face in
interpersonal interactions. National face arises, we will suggest, through the dynamic
intersection of micro, interactional concerns with macro, sociohistorical discourses about
national identity, where the latter are what give rise to the expectations that can play a
constitutive role in interaction (Haugh 2009). In other words, we are not claiming that
national face arises through interaction per se, but rather that perceptions of national face, and
expectations that it be recognised by others, play a critical role in the interpretative and
recipient design processes in micro-interactions between Mainland Chinese and Taiwanese,
including in the deployment and interpretation of aggression.
More concretely we will argue that there is a fundamental difference between
Mainland Chinese and Taiwanese ways of displaying aggression when discussing cross-Strait
issues. As we will show, the Taiwanese tend to use considerably more abusive terms of
address/forms of reference with regard to Mainland Chinese than vice versa. This raises the
question as to what the Mainland Chinese users might do instead of using such abusive forms
in online interactions, since we have no reason or evidence to believe that Mainland Chinese
are more likely to avoid conflict than their Taiwanese counterparts. As closer analysis shows,
the answer resides in their respective use of referential terms, which represent different,
competing orientations to perceived national face We analyse these different orientations
primarily by building on Bucholtz’s (1999) framework of discursive association and
dissociation in identity formation.
A comparative study of Taiwanese and Chinese online behaviours raises an important
empirical question, however, namely whether the practice of internet censorship prevalent in
Mainland China decreases the relative amount of Taiwan-related discourse. As Zittrain and
Edelman (2003) have argued, among others, the Chinese government blocks top Taiwanese
websites. This means that Mainland Chinese and Taiwanese often have no opportunities to
interact directly on political issues, and so some of this aggressive discourse takes place in
intracultural dialogues. Yet, as our paper will show, there have recently been an increasing
number of Mainland Chinese CMC discussion boards which allow open access to Taiwanese
users, and also there are cases where Taiwanese and Mainland Chinese encounter each other
and start aggressive debates spontaneously in uncontrolled online gaming websites.
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In this paper, we begin by discussing the clash between Mainland Chinese and
Taiwanese claims to national identity, and outlining how a notion of perceived national face
can be usefully deployed in analysing online verbal aggression in intergroup contexts. We
next briefly outline our data sources and methodological approaches before introducing the
results of quantitative lexical research of the use of referential terms, including, in particular,
abusive terms in online discourse. We then attempt to account for the asymmetry in the
deployment of abusive terms by Taiwanese compared to Mainland Chinese through close
analyses of micro-interactions between Mainland Chinese and Taiwanese in online discussion
boards. We conclude by briefly outlining the implications of our findings for studies of
identity and face in intergroup settings.
2. Identity and national face in Mainland Chinese and Taiwanese CMC interactions
The issue of national identity in cross-strait relations between Mainland China and Taiwan
remains both highly sensitive and increasingly disputed (Chu and Lin 2001; Dittmer 2004;
Hsu 2010; Huang 2009). While the official position in Mainland China is that Taiwan is a
renegade province of China, many citizens of Taiwan no longer consider themselves to be
(exclusively) Chinese. According to a recent poll conducted in 2008 by TVBS (a national
television broadcaster in Taiwan), 45% of respondents identified themselves as Taiwanese,
45% identified themselves as both Taiwanese and Chinese, with there being only a very small
minority of Taiwanese (4%) who identified themselves as exclusively Chinese.2 As far as we
are aware no similar poll has been conducted in Mainland China because Western-type census
research does not currently occur under the authoritarian Chinese system (Pan 2012).
However, considering the pivotal role of ideological-political education in the socialisation of
Chinese youth (Arai 2011), and the prevalence of discourse on Mainland Chinese and
Taiwanese unity in the Chinese educational system, it seems to be logical to assume that a fair
proportion of the Chinese population considers the Taiwanese to be Chinese. While no society
is unanimous in its political discourse, which can also be seen from the fact that cross-strait
discourses are not necessarily always hostile, it is likely that differences in national identity
claims by Mainland Chinese and Taiwanese users are likely to surface in CMC discussion
boards.
While CMC was initially seen as an impersonal and impoverished form of
communication, in recent years there has been an important shift towards a discursive
perspective on interpersonal dimensions of CMC, where identities are treated by analysts as
performed and transient (Georgakopoulou 2006: 548), and evaluations of im/politeness are
seen as arising locally in interactions within the context of communities of practice (Graham
2007), or latent/emergent networks (Locher 2006). The discursive shift in CMC research
entails a shift away from researchers coding forms and strategies as straightforward instances
of politeness or claims about particular identities, to an analytical focus on “expectations and
norms about what is licensed, encouraged or prohibited”, on the one hand, and what “social
actions and practices [participants] are engaged in and their own evaluations of them”, on the
other (Georgakopoulou 2006: 552). However, while the discursive approach to im/politeness
and identity accounts for variability in norms and interactional practices across online
communities, the focus of research thus far has been primarily on relational work at the
interpersonal level. It thus generally builds on an approach to identity and face rooted in the
individual (Locher 2008) or relationships between individuals (Haugh, Chang and Kádár
forthcoming). However, in studying conflict between identities at an intergroup level, which
involve issues of national identity, current approaches to face cannot be straightforwardly
deployed. An approach that complements the focus on the identity and face of individuals
with an account of collective identities and face is arguably required.

3

Aggression and perceived national face threats

In regards to the analysis of collective identity, specifically, national identity, we take
a broadly discursive perspective on national identity construction (De Cillia, Reisigl and
Wodak 1999), although we prefer to treat national identities as perceived rather than imagined
for the simple reason that perceptions of national identity held by individuals can nevertheless
play a constitutive role in interaction. In analysing the differences in national identity claims
by Mainland Chinese and Taiwanese CMC users we draw initially from Bucholtz’s (1999)
aforementioned concepts of association and dissociation. Associative identity practices
involve indexing pan-identity claims. In Sino-Taiwanese interactions this pattern was found to
be preferred by many Mainland Chinese who commonly claimed or assumed that Taiwanese
are Chinese. Dissociative identity practices involve dissociating oneself from members of
another nation. In our data this practice was more common amongst the Taiwanese users who
claimed a Taiwanese national identity as independent of Mainland Chinese.
However, it was found that differential national identity claims could not readily
explicate why the Taiwanese users displayed overt and covert forms of verbal aggression,
while the Mainland Chinese users apparently did not. We thus turned to the notion of face,
hypothesising that what occasioned displays of verbal aggression was the expectation that the
claims of Taiwanese to a national identity independent of Mainland China should be
recognised. When these claims were not recognised this was interpreted as a threat to the
national face of Taiwanese. In invoking recognition of identity claims by others, then, we
suggest that national identity claims are not only discursively constructed or disputed in
discourse, but engender certain expectations amongst interactants. These expectations
concerning recognition of national identity claims by others is what moves our analysis
beyond a singular focus on identity to a consideration of face as well.
It has been noted that members of a particular ethnic group are often concerned about
how members of other groups view them in general in intergroup contexts (Hahn and Hatfield
2011; Nwoye 1992; Sifianou 2011; Spencer-Oatey and Xing 2000). The notion of “group
face” has thus been proposed to account for face sensitivities about groups to which
individuals belong, ranging from smaller groups, such as families or workplaces, through to
large groups, such ethnicities and nationalities (Spencer-Oatey 2005). While group face has
often been theorised as “self-aspects of a person’s identity that are derived from membership
in a collective or group, and not...the identity of a group as a sui generis entity” (SpencerOatey 2005:106–107) or concern by individuals for group interests and norms (Nwoye
1992:313), we propose that in some instances a perceived group face goes beyond having
implications for just the individuals who comprise that group. Morisaki and Gudykunst
(1994), for example, claim that group face may be perceived as existing as a phenomena in its
own right rather than being parasitic on “individual face” in “intergroup situations where
there is an ongoing relationships [sic] between the groups involved” (p.73). In a number of
East Asian societies, for instance, it is commonly assumed that “family face” or “company
face” exists as an interactional concern alongside the faces of the individual members of that
family or company (Hahn and Hatfield 2011; Haugh 2005), which builds, in turn, on a
worldview where face and facework are not always assumed to be traceable to the self-image
or identity of individuals (Arundale 2009). It follows from this latter assumption that
members can perceive their group face to be threatened without this necessarily directly
translating into a threat to their own individual face as members of that group.4
We propose here that this concept of collective or group face can be extended to a
notion of perceived national face. Magistro (2007, 2011), for instance, proposes Brown and
Levinson’s (1987) notion of face be extended from Model Persons to Model Citizens in
suggesting that the latter possess “a national esteem, a public national image which is
commensurate to the sense of reputation that they attribute to their country and that they want
others to appreciate [positive national face want] and respect [negative national face want]”
4

(Magistro 2011:234). However, rather than theorising national face in terms of psychologised
wants as does Magistro, we propose here that it is more consistent with a discursive stance on
identity and impoliteness to theorise national face in terms of perceptions, which are variously
distributed across the individuals that comprise a collective social network (in this case a
nation state).
A discursive notion of national face builds first on perceptions (or beliefs) held
amongst a particular group of individuals that they share some identifying characteristics that
distinguish their group from (members of) other groups. In the case of cross-strait relations
such perceptions might include the belief held by many Taiwanese citizens that Taiwanese are
not (exclusively) Chinese, which contrasts with the belief held by many citizens of Mainland
China that Taiwanese are Chinese; represented as “Taiwanese think that Taiwanese are not
Chinese” and “Mainland Chinese think that Taiwanese are Chinese” respectively. At this
point such perceptions involve identity claims rather than face per se. However, in intergroup
interactions concern about the perceptions of the other group arguably become salient, in part
due to the obvious political, economic and military power differential between Mainland
China and Taiwan. In intergroup settings, then, it is not just the perceptions held by
individuals themselves (direct perceptions) but also their perceptions of the perceptions of
others (first-order reflexive perceptions), as well as their perceptions of the perceptions of
others of their perceptions (second-order reflexive perceptions) that arguably come to play a
constitutive role in interaction. In the case of cross-strait relations, first-order reflexive
perceptions of national identity might include perceptions such as “Taiwanese think that
Mainland Chinese think that Taiwanese are Chinese” or “Mainland Chinese think that
Taiwanese think that Taiwanese are Chinese”, while examples of second-order reflexive
perceptions of national identity might include perceptions such as “Taiwanese think that
Mainland Chinese think that Taiwanese think that Taiwanese are Chinese” or “Mainland
Chinese think that Taiwanese think that Mainland Chinese think that Taiwanese are Chinese”
and so on. It is these reflexive perceptions of national identity that underpin our claim that
intergroup relations involve not only identity concerns but also collective face concerns. In
other words, what differentiates face from identity is first that the former always involves
expectations that it be recognised by others, and indeed without such (perceived) recognition
there are no grounds for making a claim to face (Haugh 2009; O’Driscoll 2011); second that it
inevitably involves reflexive perceptions of what others think of one’s group and the like, not
simply one’s perceptions of one’s own group (Arundale 2010; Haugh and Hinze 2003); and
third that it is inherently relational (Arundale 2006, 2010), among other things. This means
that ultimately what distinguishes national face from national identity is that the former is
occasioned by reflexive expectations that these identity claims be recognised by relationally
significant others, while the latter only encompasses direct perceptions of national affiliation
which do not depend (in an existential sense) on recognition from others.
It is worth noting, of course, that a focus on claimed national identity and perceived
national face does not preclude discussion of the interpersonal or relational implications of
such intergroup interactions (Mills and Kádár 2011). Obviously, when discussing CMC
differences between mainland Chinese and Taiwanese it would be misleading to describe
national identity and face-related conflicts as clashes between two massive online
communities. Such a claim is all the more erroneous because while it is possible to observe
certain rhetorical patterns in conflict, it is impossible to systematically describe the myriads of
the differences among individual manifestations of behaviour. It is more productive in the
ultimate analysis, we believe, to treat concerns for “group” and “individual” face not as
dichotomous, but rather as dynamic, inter-related dimensions of an inclusive notion of face
that is fundamentally relational in nature (Arundale 2009, 2010), although space precludes us
here from developing such a line of argument further.4 In any case, while we make passing
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reference to the interpersonal concerns in our latter analysis, our focus in this paper is
primarily on issues of national identity and perceived national face in online discussion
boards, and it is to these issues that we now turn.
3. Data and methodology
The data in this study is drawn from two main sources: (1) web-based text written by
Mainland Chinese or Taiwanese accessible via general search engines, and (2) online
discussion boards frequented by Mainland Chinese and Taiwanese users. We used these
sources in an interdependent way in the course of the following three steps:
1. Search of online discussion boards to identify the most popular abusive forms of
address/reference;
2. General web search to examine the relative frequency of these forms;
3. And finally a discursive exploration of discussion boards, in order to better understand
the localised usages of these forms in online interactions (and/or the reason behind
their non-occurrence in some instances).
The analysis of abusive terms in the present research is based on the concept of word
frequency (Yates 1996). In the initial phase of the present research we set out to examine
Mainland Chinese and Taiwanese use of terms that insult or threaten the other group. After
making a selection of the most salient abusive terms used by Mainland Chinese and
Taiwanese on discussion boards, we narrowed the list down to fifteen forms of
address/reference that were frequently used in online settings.
In the next step, we studied frequency of these expressions through general search of
online texts written by Mainland Chinese and Taiwanese. It might have been fruitful to limit
the analysis to vocative cases in discussion boards only. However, online Sino–Taiwanese
aggression discourse often takes place in intragroup rather than intergroup settings, and in
various modes of CMC. That is, in many cases the Chinese and the Taiwanese interact only
with their fellow countrymen and women, and they refer to rather than address people from
the other side. While in such interactions aggression is always present at least potentially,
such aggression would be labelled in psychology as indirect rather than direct(e.g. Hess and
Hagen 2006).Since indirect aggression is more frequent than its direct counterpart, studying
referential cases helped us to overview the types and frequency of abusive language use in
China and Taiwan in relation to the other side. It is worth noting that when analysing
discursive behaviour we analysed manifestations of direct aggression only, since we were
ultimately interested in how such terms are used in intergroup interactions.
We only analysed cursing terms in which either ‘China’ (Dalu 大陸 ‘mainland China’)
or ‘Taiwan’ (or other references to the countries) occurred, in the compound form
‘China/Taiwan + X’ and ‘Taiwan + X’. There are in fact two different official designations
for China, namely the aforementioned Dalu and the official form Zhongguo (中國). Forms
containing the latter (e.g. Zhongguo-gou 中國狗 ‘Chinese dog’) were excluded from the
analysis because while ‘mainland’ (Dalu) is inherently ‘exclusive’ (i.e., ‘mainland’ ≠
‘Taiwan’ and other overseas Chinese communities), Zhongguo is ‘inclusive’ in that in certain
ideological contexts it can refer to Taiwan as part of China; for instance, Zhongguo-gou
(‘Chinese dog’) can refer to Taiwanese in certain contexts. There were also some
‘ambivalent’ terms that we excluded from the analysis such as si-hanjian 死汉奸 (‘traitor of
China who should die’) as they are frequently used by both Mainland Chinese and Taiwanese.
For example, while si-hanjian is mostly used by Mainland Chinese to abuse Taiwanese, in
some cases it is also used by the Taiwanese. Finally, we restricted our research to forms that
originate in standard Chinese; e.g. ‘426’ is not counted in spite of the fact that it is fairly
common in online discourse.5
6

After identifying fifteen abusive forms of address/reference, we conducted Google
searches in order to observe their relative frequency. In what follows we outline how we
constrained this lexical search with reference to Dalu-gou 大陸狗 (‘mainland Chinese dog’),
a common abusive form of address/reference used by Taiwanese:










Imputed “大陸狗” (in quotation marks): 89,100 hits;
Refined the search by inserting “Taiwan” (“臺灣”) and -Singapore (-新加坡), -Hong
Kong (-香港), -Malaysia (-馬來西亞), etc., in order to ensure that the retrieved data only
reflects Mainland Chinese and Taiwanese hits (in other overseas Chinese communities,
including notably Hong Kong, there is also a prevailing anti-Chinese political discourse,
see Mathews et al. 2008:171);
Excluded compound forms in which the use of “mainland Chinese dog” could be nonabusive, e.g. -pet (-宠物), -veterinary (-医师), -dog meat (-肉), -dog species (-犬);
Excluded cases where an abusive form occurred in reference to the other side’s verbal
abusive behaviour, that is, in situations when Chinese posters intend to generate antiTaiwanese sentiments or vice versa. This was done simply by limiting our Google search
to either traditional (Taiwanese) or simplified (mainland Chinese) fonts. Considering that
empirical research shows that few Taiwanese use simplified fonts and perhaps even less
mainlanders use simplified ones, excluding abusive terms where the font is different to
that of the surrounding text is likely to remove Taiwanese metapragmatic discourse on
Chinese abusive language use, and vice versa, from the analysis. In other words,
Taiwanese users of abusive terms were identified through their use of traditional Chinese
characters, while Mainland users were identified through their use of simplified Chinese
characters.
Excluded cases in which the poster’s/author’s national identity cannot be defined with
certainty. Although in the majority of the cases the orthographic method discussed above
also helped us to ascertain whether the user was from Taiwan or Mainland China, there
were a few scattered exceptions to this trend. For example, as we shall see in the case of
extract 1 below, some educated Chinese netizens intentionally use traditional characters as
a form of (potentially mock) association with the Taiwanese. Due to this, if there was any
doubt with regards to the national identity of a netizen – that is, in cases in which this was
not clear from the given utterance – we attempted to manually analyse textual and
contextual clues.
Manually checked the remaining hits to ascertain whether they in fact reflect Mainland
Chinese and Taiwanese conflict; this final search resulted in roughly 53,600 hits.

While this lexical research is not fully precise in the sense that Google only retrieves
estimated results, and is not necessarily always reliable, it does arguably reveal broad
quantitative trends in the usage of such terms between Mainland Chinese and Taiwanese.
While the recall rate of search engines is much debated (e.g. Zhu and Dreher 2008), through
our manual check we were able to establish at least a centimal precision rate (see also Section
4). In any case, our focus was on the relative occurrence of these terms in Mainland Chinese
versus Taiwanese online text, not absolute frequencies.
This lexical frequency analysis was followed by a discursive analysis of threads from
online discussion boards containing instances of such terms. Messages posted to discussion
boards are asynchronous and persistent, which means that multiple participants can view and
respond to a single message or post. Discussion boards also provide for two-way anonymous
message transmission, which makes them a potential hotbed for conflict since anonymity can
lead to an increase in conflictive behaviour in online settings (Ishii 2010). The possibility of
quoting in discussion boards also aids conflict because by repeatedly quoting a flaming
7
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message it is easier to keep the conflict active. The data studied exhibits considerable
diversity in regards to various ‘situation factors’ (Herring 2007), including ‘participant
characteristics’, ‘purpose’ and ‘activity’, which all differ to some extent across these online
discussion boards. For example, in certain online communities abusive terms are used
considerably more than in others. However, since we are focusing on threats to perceived
national face, such variation was backgrounded in the collection of data, with the focus being
mainly on ensuring the ‘topic’ and ‘tone’ of the discussion boards examined were relatively
homogenous.
In undertaking more detailed qualitative analyses of threads at random from the online
discussion boards, we followed Herring’s (2007) “by theme” approach, that is, we selected
topically interesting threads, namely, where there was metapragmatic discussion of SinoTaiwanese relations, and then analysed every message in a given thread. The data collected
include roughly 30,000 Chinese characters.6 In order to understand the relative size of this
dataset, it is pertinent to note that Chinese words are mostly constituted from one to three
characters.

4. Abusive terms in online discussion boards
The present section first overviews the results of the quantitative analysis of the relative
frequency of a number of abusive terms and then discusses the implications of these findings.
As the present study aims to broad quantitative trends, with a particular focus on their relative
frequency amongst Mainland Chinese and Taiwanese users, numbers in the tables are given in
centimal. That is, in the course of this analysis we intentionally rounded numbers to the
nearest 100: numbers which end as 50 or below are rounded below, and numbers from 51 are
rounded above. This approach seems to be particularly reasonable given the previously
discussed issues in regards to the recall rate of search engines, and also given our focus on
relative rather than absolute frequency of occurence.
4.1. Frequency of occurrence abusive terms
Animal metaphors – most importantly ‘pig’ and ‘dog’ – were the most frequently used
vocative forms of abuse, which is consistent with norms of Chinese rudeness in the political
arena (Kuo 2003). The results of this lexical analysis are illustrated in the following tables,
which introduce terms in pairs; that is, the Chinese and Taiwanese terms of abuse are
represented in semantic pairs (where available).
Term

1. Dalu-gou 大陸狗
(‘mainland China dog’)

2. Dalu-zhu 大陸豬
(‘Mainland Chinese
pig’)

Estimated frequency

32,500

6,700

Term

4. Tai(wan)-gou 台(湾)
狗 (‘Taiwanese dog’)

5. Tai(wan)-zhu 台(湾)
猪 (‘Taiwanese pig’)

Estimated frequency

12,900

7,100

Table 1: ‘Dog/pig/devil-group’

8

3. Dalu-gui 大陸鬼
(子) (‘Mainland
Chinese devil’)
12,200
6. Tai(wan)-gui(zi) 台
(湾) 鬼(子)
(‘Taiwanese devil’)
2,500

The first group includes a common group of compound terms – ‘mainland China/Taiwan +
dog/pig/devil’ forms – which are used by both Mainland Chinese and Taiwanese users.
Equating the enemy with a dog (gou), pig (zhu) or devil (gui) is a traditional practice in
Chinese (Kádár 2007), and so these forms can be regarded as standard manifestations of
abusive terms. In terms of their relative proportion, the Taiwanese seem to use these abusive
terms more frequently than vice versa: while Tai(wan)-zhu ‘Taiwanese pig’ occurs slightly
more frequently than Dalu-zhu ‘Mainland Chinese pig’, in sum there are 51,400 estimated
occurrence of terms derogating Mainland Chinese, while there are only 22,500 occurrences of
terms involving derogation of Taiwanese.
It should be noted that the dog/pig/devil-forms show some variation: ‘Taiwan + X’
often occurs in the abbreviated ‘Tai + X’ form. Furthermore, in some cases gui ‘devil’ is
combined with the nominal suffix zi 子 as in guizi. Gui vs. guizi are not necessarily
interchangeable: guizi has connotations of more archaic usage, that is, Taiwan-guizi and Daluguizi occur more frequently in historical contexts.

Term

Estimated frequency
Term

Estimated frequency

7. Dalu-fen(fen) 大陸
糞(糞) (‘mainland
China excrement’)
1,400

8. Dalu-shi 大陸屎
(‘Mainland Chinese
excrement’)
500

9. Tai(wan)-fen(fen)台
湾粪(粪) (‘Taiwan
excrement’)
400

10. Tai(wan)-shi 台
(湾)屎 (‘Taiwanese
excrement’)
100

Table 2: ‘Excrement-group’

A second group of abusive forms of address/reference are those that include ‘excrement’, i.e.
fen(fen) 糞(糞) and shi 屎.7 In a similar way to the abusive terms in the previous groups, these
expressions have historical predecessors (Kádár 2007), that is, equating the enemy with
excrement is a traditional Chinese discursive practice. However, unlike the previous
‘dog/pig/devil-group’, these terms are rarely used in online texts. The rate of occurrence of
Mainland Chinese and Taiwanese-related excrement terms is roughly equivalent to that of the
‘dog/pig/devil-group’, i.e. the Taiwanese seem to use these terms more frequently than the
Mainland Chinese.
Term
Estimated frequency

11. Zhina-zhu 支那豬
(‘China pig’)
154,500

12. Zhina-gou 支那狗
(‘China dog’)
15,700

13. Zhina-gui 支那鬼
(‘China dog’)
2,300

Table 3: Shina-group

A third group of frequently occuring abusive terms of address/reference used by Taiwanese in
online CMC discussion boards is what have we defined as the ‘Sina-group’. Shina 支那
(Zhina in Chinese), transliterated from Sanskrit, is a nationalistic term of contempt used in
reference to Mainland China, which was widely used by the Japanese until the end of WWII
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(Fogel 1991). As Japanese was the official language in Taiwan until the handover of Taiwan
to the Republic of China in 1945, in Taiwanese Mandarin ‘Sina + X’ loanword forms became
a widely-spread form to express contempt for the Mainland Chinese.8 The popularity of these
forms is explained by Taiwan’s historical ties to Japan due to being a part of Japan for fifty
years (1895–1945): in Taiwan there is a prevalent discourse on the cultural similarity between
Japan and Taiwan at the cost of ‘Chineseness’ (Lam 2004), and this claim of cultural
closeness manifests itself also in the use of ‘Sina-terms’.
Term

14. Tai-8-zi 台 8 子
(‘Taiwanese bastard’)

Estimated frequency

8,100

15. Si-a’gong 死阿共
(‘Commie to be
killed’)
29,900

Table 4. ‘Taiwanese bastard’

Finally, there are two further abusive forms that have no equivalents. The first one, Tai-8-zi
台 8 子 (‘Taiwanese bastard’), is a noteworthy form in that it is the only internet-specific term
among the frequently used terms of abuse. 8-zi is a form of numeral slang for bazi 八字
(‘bastard’), and as such is an interesting manifestation of so-called net-language (Crystal
2000:34). Si-a’gong 死阿共 (‘Commie to be killed’) is a militant form of reference to
mainland Chinese and it seems to be frequently used by not only Taiwanese Chinese but also
by Hong Kong users, although in the present study only use of the term by Taiwanese was
included in the final count.
4.2. Implications
Quantitative research into frequency of abusive terms suggests that the Mainland Chinese use
abusive terms much less frequently than the Taiwanese users. There were 255,700 Chinadirected abusive forms, but only 31,200 occurrences of Taiwan-directed abusive forms. In
other words, abusive terms were directed at the Mainland Chinese eight times more frequently
than at the Taiwanese. One could argue that this difference is due to the fact that we cannot
hear the voice of Mainland Chinese online. However, if we look into statistical data it
becomes evident that this is not the case. As recent data shows, Taiwan has a very high
internet penetration rate (70.1%), with an estimated 16,130,000 users. China has a
considerably lower internet penetration rate (34.4%), but the number of Chinese internet users
is estimated to be up to 457,000,000.9 As was already noted in the introduction, internet
censorship does not influence Mainland Chinese discussions about Taiwanese issues.
Furthermore, in light of the ruling Chinese Communist Party’s attempts to maintain antiTaiwanese rhetoric both in the media and in online settings (Kalathil and Boas 2003), it seems
unlikely that the Chinese authorities would censor displays of verbal aggression by Mainland
Chinese towards Taiwanese, particularly in discussions of nationhood and national identity.
The question thus remains as to why the Mainland Chinese do not use abusive terms as
frequently as Taiwanese users.
In order to examine this further, we hypothesised that the use of pan-Chinese terms of
reference by Mainland Chinese constitutes an associative identity practice, as it implicitly
asserts sovereignty over the Taiwanese. Following an analytic methodology similar to the one
used in estimating the frequency of abusive terms in online discussion boards, we searched
for forms of address/reference that are typically used in pan-Chinese nationalistic discourse,
including:
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Taiwan tongbaomen 台湾同胞们 ‘Taiwanese compatriots’
Dalu tongbaomen 大陸同胞們 ‘mainland Chinese compatriots’
Taiwan xiongdimen 台湾兄弟们 ‘Taiwanese brothers’
Dalu xiongdimen 大陸兄弟們 ‘mainland Chinese brothers’
Taiwan pengyoumen 台湾朋友们 ‘mainland Chinese friends’
Dalu pengyoumen 大陸朋友們 ‘mainland Chinese friends’

We searched the online occurrence of these expressions by excluding cases where they refer
to fellow countrymen, by adding “+大陸” (China) to Taiwanese expressions, and +台湾
(Taiwan) to Chinese expressions, and the plural vocative pronoun (nimen 你們) to the search.
We also refined the search by browsing only mainland Chinese websites for Taiwan-specific
terms of association, and vice versa for Taiwanese terms. The frequency of occurrence of
these terms after this search is shown in Table 5 below.

Term

1. Taiwan tongbaomen
台湾同胞
们’Taiwanese
compatriots’
730,200

3. Taiwan xiongdimen
5. Taiwan pengyoumen
台湾兄弟
台湾朋友们 ‘mainland
们’Taiwanese brothers’ Chinese friends’
45,200

573,800

Term

2. Dalu tongbaomen 大
陸同胞們 ‘mainland
Chinese compatriots’

4. Dalu xiongdimen 大
陸兄弟們 ‘mainland
Chinese brothers’

6. Dalu pengyoumen
大陸朋友們 ‘mainland
Chinese friends’

Estimated frequency

92,100

700

132,500

Estimated frequency

Table 5. Terms of nationalistic association

The frequency of these pan-Chinese terms in relation to Mainland Chinese and Taiwanese in
online discussion boards is markedly different and contrasts directly with the occurrence of
abusive terms. While there were 1,349,200 estimated occurrences of pan-Chinese terms used
in reference to Taiwan(ese), there were only 225,300 occurrences of pan-Chinese terms used
in reference to Mainland Chinese. We have no means of ascertaining how many of these
terms occurred in aggressive contexts, but the overall difference in frequency of these terms
illustrates that amongst mainland Chinese users they are considerably more common (up to
six times more) than amongst Taiwanese users. In what follows, we closely examine threads
from three different online discussion boards to illustrate the way in which Taiwanese users
respond to these forms with overt or covert aggression, which, we will suggest, indicates that
the Taiwanese users evaluate pan-Chinese terms of reference as threatening to their perceived
national face.
5. Perceived national face threats in online discussion boards
In the course of analysing threads in our sample dataset of 30,000 characters we uncovered a
general trend for associative forms used by Chinese to occasion both overt verbal abuse and
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covert forms of abuse in the form of “mock politeness” or sarcasm on the part of Taiwanese
users. We identified 124 such interactions where the Taiwanese users appeared to evaluate
forms of nationalistic association as offensive.10 In the following excerpt taken from a large
online discussion board covering a wide range of issues, the use of an associative term
(Taiwan tongbaomen) by a mainland Chinese user elicited both covert and overt forms of
verbal abuse from Taiwanese users.
(1)

埃及醒了，台湾同胞们呢？？？？？
Post 1 (xxphone 發表於 2011-2-19 02:40 PM):
大陸是一黨專政，台灣人嗤之以鼻。台灣民主執政，
可實際狀況也好不到哪去。[…]
Post 2 (qaz3wsxqaz3wsx 發表於 2011-2-19 02:48 PM):
我只想問
台灣人醒不醒干你們中共人民什關西? […]
Post 8 (padypc 發表於 2011-2-19 05:11 PM):
貴國是否甦醒是取決於貴國人民的智慧 […]
Post 10 (CVB151 發表於 2011-2-19 05:28 PM):
[…] 我們台灣同胞本來就是醒的，你們在中共統治下才要醒醒。[…]
Egypt revolted – what will our Taiwanese compatriots do? ? ? ? ?
Post 1 (xxphone):
Mainland China is a one party dictatorship, and the Taiwanese give it a snort of
contempt.Taiwan is a democratic country, but in reality democracy is good for
nothing
Post 2 (qaz3wsxqaz3wsx):
I would only like to ask
What on earth do you Communists have to do with whether Taiwan has revolted or
not?
Post 8 (padypc):
Whether your precious country will revolt or not depends on your precious country’s
intelligence
Post 10 (CVB151):
We Taiwanese compatriots have already revolted; you are the ones who should revolt
against the Chinese Communist Party
(Source: http://www.eyny.com/archiver/tid-5963376.html)

This interaction represents an open challenge to Taiwanese by a mainland Chinese user,
xxphone, who appears to be aiming to flame a discussion by calling Taiwanese Chinese to
‘revolt’ like the anti-Mubarak protesters against their government, as well as by describing
Taiwanese democracy in negative terms (post 1). Interestingly, the first Taiwanese responder,
qaz3wsxqaz3wsx, focuses primarily on disputing the claimed Sino-Taiwanese relationship
and not the other potentially offensive claims in post 2. That is, it seems that xxphone’s use of
the term Taiwan tongbaomen (‘Taiwanese compatriots’) is treated as the most salient offence
12

in this interaction. The term tongbaomen here refers to both Mainland Chinese and Taiwanese
(i.e. it is inclusive). It thus constitutes an instance of an associative identity practice, although
it is open to question whether this was meant ironically or not considering the dissociative
implications of the remainder of xxphone’s post. However, this ironic reading of Taiwan
tongbaomen does not appear to have been picked up on by the subsequent respondents, as the
next few Taiwanese responders also react in a hostile manner to the question whether Taiwan
should revolt while they continue to maintain qaz3wsxqaz3wsx’s rejection of Sino-Taiwanese
association using terms such as bieren-de-guojia 別人的國家 (‘other countries’), which
implicitly assert Taiwan’s independence from Mainland China (data not cited). The wish to
dissociate national identities becomes even more marked when the Taiwanese poster padypc
uses the honorific form guiguo 貴國 ‘your precious country’ to refer to China (post 8). As
argued in Kádár (2007), forms like guiguo are used in Chinese diplomacy in order to elevate
other countries, and so in the present context this honorific form of reference presupposes
dissociation between Taiwan and Mainland China. Through such marked deference the poster
is able to convey sarcasm and contempt for the position of Mainland Chinese in regards to
national identity, and so the post is open evaluation as a form of “mock politeness” (Culpeper
1996, 2011). This utterance is soon followed by another dissociative practice when a
Taiwanese poster CVB151 reinterprets tongbao ‘compatriot’ (post 10): he refers to the
Taiwanese group as “we Taiwanese compatriots” and to the Chinese as “you”. By using
tongbao as an in-group (i.e. Taiwanese) self-reference and referring to the Chinese as “you”,
CVB151 makes it clear that the Chinese do not belong to his group of tongbao (‘compatriots’).
The Mainland Chinese poster’s claim to a pan-Chinese national identity through the
use of Taiwan tongbaomen (‘Taiwanese compatriots’) is interpreted by these respondents as
neglecting the Taiwanese claim to a separate national identity. This occasions a threat to the
perceived national face of the Taiwanese users, as it potentially generates reflexive
perceptions on the part of the Taiwanese users that Mainland Chinese think that Taiwanese
are Chinese (first-order reflexive perception). It further generates the perception on the part of
the Taiwanese users that the Mainland Chinese think the Taiwanese think that Taiwanese are
Chinese (second-order reflexive perception). Since how the Taiwanese users perceive the
Mainland Chinese to perceive them is not in accordance with their national identity claim,
namely, that Taiwanese are not (exclusively) Chinese, these reflexive perceptions can be
evaluated as threatening to their perceived national face.
It is interesting to note that the Taiwanese reaction in this thread is a typical one, as
can be shown with reference to metapragmatic discourse on the use of tongbaomen
(‘compatriots’) by Mainland Chinese when used in reference to Taiwanese. For instance, in
2008, a Sino-Taiwanese discussion occurred on an online discussion board under the title
Weishenme zai Taiwanren mianqian chenghu duifang wei tongbao jiu name lingren taoyan 为
什么在台湾人面前称呼对方为同胞就那么令对方讨厌 (‘Why do the Taiwanese dislike it if
they are called ‘compatriots’?’).11 In this discussion, which took place on the open-access
Mainland Chinese Tianya 天涯 bulletin board, the vast majority of Taiwanese posters
strongly refused to be described as tongbao, making a wide variety of linguistic and political
arguments about the impropriety of this expression in Sino-Taiwanese relationships.
In what follows, we examine two further case studies from CMC discussion boards, in
which there is evidence that the associative implications of tongbao were interpreted as
offensive by Taiwanese posters, in spite of the fact that the mainland Chinese posts were
ostensibly “polite”. Such cases are noteworthy because they further illustrate that associative
identity practices are open to be evaluated as rude or offensive in the context of intergroup
Sino-Taiwanese interactions.
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(2)

哎，台湾同胞们，让你们见笑了
Post 1 (221.221.217.* 2009-02-11 01:34):
来到这个吧，才知道
台湾人为什么讨厌中国人
看到那么多中国人的帖子
我实在是无语了
面对真相，他们就是不相信
反而用低俗愚蠢的话语攻击你们
请你们多多包涵了，
不过不是每个中国人都是处在愚昧无知中的
只不过我们也没能力没办法，
想想如果你们生在中国
对吗？
Post 2 (兔兔 2009-02-11 01:38):
楼主：
谁是你同胞啊？
你是支那猪， 台湾人是台湾人。
少来花花肠子了。
Post 3 (151.80.235.* 2009-02-11 04:54):
兔兔也真的不用这么绝情呢,多一个朋友要比多一个敌人要要好..
大陆人是值得我们同情的...............即使敌人也需要我们的同情,,,,
他们是共产党的牺牲品.........我们生活在自由世界的人.怎么可以和他们计较呢
Ah, Taiwanese compatriots, we ridiculed you.
Post 1 (221.221.217.*):
Only when I visited this discussion board did I realise
why the Taiwanese hate the Chinese
Seeing so many Chinese posts
I lost my word
In fact, these Chinese posters don’t trust [you]
and they use nasty words to bully you
Please be so kind to forgive us
in fact not every Chinese is as ignorant as those posters are
we can’t do anything against this,
Imagine if you were born in China [like them]
Right?
Post 2 (Tutu):
Who is your compatriot?
You are Sina-pigs and the Taiwanese are Taiwanese.
Refrain from using cunning words.
Post 3 (51.80.235.*):
Tutu, you don’t need to be so cruel, it is better to make friends than enemies..
14

Mainlanders deserve our sympathy ............... even the enemy deserves our
sympathy ,,,,
They are the victims of the Communist Party, while we are living in a free world. Why
would it make sense to dispute things with them?
(Source: http://www.ipobar.com/read.php?tid-49099.html#appear)
This interaction took place in the politics section of a large Taiwanese online discussion board
that was accessed by a Mainland Chinese poster (221.221.217.*). The thread above begins
with a collective apology by 221.221.217.* for the behaviour of other Mainland Chinese users
who are critical and aggressive towards Taiwanese in many postings.
221.221.217.*’s pragmatic act is seemingly “polite” from the perspective of a
traditional Brown and Levinsonian (1987) interpretation: apart from the apology itself,
221.221.217.* makes use of different formulaic expressions of politeness such as deferential
request (qing 请 ‘please’), a formal expression of apology (duoduo-baohan 多多包涵 ‘kindly
forgive us’), and denigrating terms in reference to mainland Chinese (yumei-wuzhi 愚昧无知
‘be stupid and ignorant’) (post 1). However, the next poster Tutu reacts to this apology in an
aggressive way: Tutu criticises 221.221.217.* for calling Taiwanese tongbao ‘compatriot’ by
first posting a rhetorical question, “Who is your compatriot?”, which implies rejection of the
inclusive connotations of tongbao (post 2). Tutu further describes the ostensibly polite post as
an instance of huahua-changzi 花花肠子 (‘cunning words’), as well as invoking the abusive
referential form Zhina-zhu (‘Sina-pig’). This negative evaluation of 221.221.217.*’s initial
post is reiterated by the next poster, 51.80.235.*, who is more covertly aggressive in contrast
to Tutu. In post 3 the user pretends to admonish Tutu for responding in such a harsh way to
221.221.217.*’s post, and also expresses sympathy towards the Mainland Chinese. However,
this user formulates this post in an ironic way, as s/he refers to the Mainland Chinese as the
“enemy” (diren), and it thus appears to be another instance of “mock politeness” (Culpeper
1996, 2011). In this way, the third post reinforces the second poster’s attempt to dissociate
Taiwanese from Mainland Chinese. Once again we suggest that what occasions these overt
and covert displays of aggression on the part of the Taiwanese users is the threat to their
perceived national face that the use of inclusive, pan-Chinese terms represents.12
The interaction above illustrates that the use of such terms by Mainland Chinese are
often evaluated as aggressive, sometimes even independently of the poster’s putative intention
to be polite. The next interaction – in which Chinese and Taiwanese posters meet in a
relatively apolitical context – further illustrates the national face-threatening potential of such
expressions of association:
(3)

台湾同胞们，请看帖子！
Post 1 (疯狂海军 07/19/2010 02:30:25):
本是同根生，相煎何太急！
各位台灣同胞！請你體諒我們大陸玩家！我們視你們為兄弟姐妹，你們何故要
傷害我們呢？
不說政治的話題，說說歷史！你知道在遙遠的歷史我們本是一個祖先？我們都
是炎黃的子孫後代！為何不團結一起呢？高麗棒子在我們教訓他們，但是他們
分開了何必要重言自己的同胞們呢？我們都是一家人，從過去到現在都是！我
們要團結不能被外人的搗鼓導致我們的分裂！~台灣的兄弟姐們！我們永遠都是
一家人！以後可不能因為一點小事就這樣惡言傷人了！团结一致、共同游戏！
Post 2 (Zart 1. 07/19/2010 09:25:56):
15

Aggression and perceived national face threats

第一.
兩岸只有文化根基相同,長期的隔離與發展後,我們不覺得跟你們是什麼所謂的兄
弟姐妹,更別提貴國政府與人民經常性的擺出侵略性、攻擊性的態度 […]
所以拜託什麼認親大會請先去非洲谷地辦吧...請認清國際現實
第二.
懇請兩岸問題與種族問題請勿一再拿到 battle.net 這類中立區域來討戰, 這會造成
BZ 管理員的困擾 […] 這裡是遊戲版面...
Post 3 (Deltablue 2. 07/29/2010 07:14:29):
[本是同根生] [各位台灣同胞] [本是一個祖先] [都是炎黃的子孫] [我們都是一家
人，從過去到現在都是]
在我看來全部是[文化侵略]
我們不希望在遊戲上談論 [政治] [兩國(岸)關係] 這種 [文化侵略] 也別來了 好嗎??
Taiwanese compatriots, please read this post!
Post 1 (Fengkuang Haijun [Insane Navy]):
We have the same national roots, so why we should shoot on each other so quickly?
All Taiwanese compatriots! Please forgive us mainland Chinese players! We are your
brothers and sisters, why should you harm us? This is nothing to do with politics, it is
all about history! Don’t we have the same ancestors? We are the descendants of the
Mythical Emperors! Why don’t we unite? Let us give a lesson to those [South] Korean
hoodlums who cannot unite with their compatriots [i.e. North Koreans]. We are
members of the same family, from ancient times until present. We should unite and
not let outsiders to divide us! ~ Taiwanese brothers and sisters! We will always be a
family! From now on we should not insult each other because of small matters. Let us
unite and play together!
Post 2 (Zart 1):
Firstly: The two sides of the Taiwan Strait only have cultural relationship. We have
been separated and developed separately for a long period, and this is why we don’t
feel that we are your so-called “brothers or sisters”, not mentioning that your precious
country and its citizens often display aggressiveness and hostility […]
Therefore, if you wish to seek relational cords, we pray you to proceed to the
wilderness of Africa to do this [in a maximum of isolation] … Please don’t be naïve
about international relationships.
Secondly: I earnestly request you not to bring cross-Strait issues and ethnicity ever
after into Battle.net’s neutral discussion of war matters, as this may disturb BZ [i.e.
Battle Zone] moderators. […] This is a game discussion forum.
Post 3 (Deltablue 2.):
“Have the same national roots”, “all Taiwanese compatriots”, “have the same
ancestors”, “the descendants of the Mythical Emperors”, “we are members of the same
family, from ancient times until present”
In my view these are all terms of “cultural aggression”.
Keep out “politics” and “cross-Strait” and all this kind of “cultural aggression” from
our game, will you?
(Source: http://forums.battle.net/thread.html?topicId=25969523700andsid=5021)
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This interaction took place on a thread on the online game “battle.net’s” discussion board
relating to the simulated battle ‘Decisive Battle for the Senkaku Islands’ (juezhan Diaoyutai
決戰釣魚台), which is an island chain claimed by Taiwan, Japan and Mainland China.
Importantly, while battle.net is a multilingual and multicultural game website and is officially
politics-free, players sometimes do discuss real political matters on the discussion board on
this website, although ‘hostilities’ do not generally stir metapragmatic debates or generate
wider attention.
Here, Fengkuang Haijun’s call to Taiwanese players – that is to ‘unite forces’ with
Mainland Chinese players both in the game and in discussions relating to game – seems to be
spontaneous. Fengkuang Haijun claims his post has “nothing to do with politics” (bu shuo
zhengzhi de huati 不說政治的話題), and he also attempts to ‘give face’ to Taiwanese
players/posters by performing a collective apology (in a similar way to the first post on the
previous thread) on behalf of Mainland Chinese (Glinert 2010). However, his posting is
received in an extremely critical way by other players. Altogether six players responded to
this post, with all being critical (although due to space constraints we only cite two responses).
In the first response by Zart (post 2), the term xiongdi-jiemei 兄弟姐妹 ‘elder and younger
brothers and sisters’ is rejected, similar to Tutu’s rejection of tongbao in example 2. He also
projects dissociation by not only explicitly rejecting a close Sino-Taiwanese relationship (“if
you wish to seek relational cords, we pray you to proceed to the wilderness of Africa to do
this [in a maximum of isolation]”), but also by using the honorific form of address guiguo
(‘your precious country’). He also projects relational distance from Fengkuang Haijun by
using a wide variety of deferential forms such as baituo 拜託 (‘pray you’). In this sense, he
seems to follow the same pattern as padypc in example (1) and 51.80.235* in example (2), in
projecting mock politeness, since the use of use such deferential forms is marked in a online
context where such forms occur relatively infrequently. Zart’s post is followed by one from
Deltablue who evaluates Fengkuang Haijun’s attempts to project association as a form of
“cultural aggression” (wenhua-qinlüe 文化侵略) (post 3).
In sum, these threads illustrate that in Sino-Taiwanese interactions the Mainland
Chinese users do not necessarily need to use explicitly abusive terms in order to be perceived
as projecting threats to the perceived national face of Taiwanese users. This threat arises from
(reflexive) perceptions on the part of the Taiwanese users that the Mainland Chinese users are
neglecting or even rejecting the claimed national identity of Taiwanese as not (exclusively)
Chinese.
6. Concluding remarks

The present paper has set out to examine Sino-Taiwanese use of abusive terms in online
discussion boards. Our focus has been on terms of address/reference through which
differences between Mainland Chinese and Taiwanese orientations to perceived national face
threats manifest themselves. Further research thus remains to be done to explore other
strategies in Sino-Taiwanese aggression discourse. One of our key findings in relation to
referring expressions has been that the Taiwanese are more likely to apply terms that openly
abuse the Mainland Chinese than vice versa. Furthermore, in Sino-Taiwanese interactions the
Mainland Chinese are more likely to use associative identity practices, such as the ostensibly
polite forms tongbaomen (‘compatriots’) or xiongdijiemei (‘brothers and sisters’). On the
other hand, the Taiwanese tend to respond with dissociative identity practices, such as the use
of abusive terms, negative metapragmatic discourse on the use of such pan-Chinese forms of
address/reference, marked use of deferential forms, as well as sarcasm. We interpret this
difference to be a reflection of broader macro-discourses on national identity. The Mainland
Chinese claim that Taiwan is a part of China, and many Mainland Chinese users reinforce this
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claim through the use of pan-Chinese reference terms. Considering China’s increasing global
and regional dominance, the Mainland Chinese assume the position of the powerful party in
these interactions. The Taiwanese users, on the other hand, seem to prefer to dissociate their
national identity from that of Mainland Chinese, and thus respond aggressively to threats to
their perceived national face. We suggest, however, that further study in this area is necessary
to shed more light on the relationship between threats to perceived national face in the context
of intergroup settings, and interpersonal implications for relationships between participants
that arise in such interactions. Our focus in this paper has been on the former, but this is not to
say that that latter is not also of considerable importance in the context of Sino-Taiwanese
relations.
Notes
1

We are not claiming here that Sino-Taiwanese interactions on discussion boards are
inherently hostile. While studying this issue is beyond the scope of the present study, cases
can be found when various Chinese and Taiwanese groups make use of a ‘pan-Chinese’
national face in order to position themselves as ‘allies’, for instance.

2

http://www.tvbs.com.tw/FILE_DB/DL_DB/even/200806/even-20080610175239.pdf (cf.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Taiwanese_identity).
3

The distinction between direct and first/second-order reflexive perceptions draws in part
from Arundale’s (2010) discussion of the different levels of face interpreting in Face
Constituting Theory (FCT). Our approach here differs, however, in that we focus on
perceptions of identity claims in intergroup contexts rather than interpretations of relational
connection or separation in interpersonal settings, although we believe our approach is not
inconsistent with that outlined in FCT.
4

We are not claiming here that these different aspects of face are necessarily hierarchically
ordered. Whether one or the other takes precedence is entirely a matter of locally situated
contingencies.
5

426 refers to mainland Chinese as in Taiwanese (Minnan) its pronunciation is close to si-alu
死阿陸 ‘mainlander to be killed’. From a cultural perspective this is a noteworthy expression:
426 is originally an ‘unlucky number’ (in Chinese, number 4 is unlucky, and in 426 4
becomes significant as it is a middle value between 2 and 6), and so this negative meaning
further increases 426’s abusive value.
6

Since these texts include alphabetical letters, emoticons and other forms, this figure is only a
rough estimation.
7

Fen frequently occurs in a reduplicated form, although single and reduplicated variants seem
to convey similar meanings.
8

It can be claimed that the three ‘Sina-forms’ are loanwords and not Taiwanese creations
because all of these forms occur in historical Japanese texts (e.g. Shina-no-inoko 支那猪子
for the contemporary Taiwanese Zhina-zhu), and also a check of current use on the internet
reveals that these forms also occur on contemporary Japanese websites.

9

Source: http://www.internetworldstats.com/asia.htm.
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10

Since this analysis is based on sampled data there are no claims, of course, that it is
definitive, and the hypothesis we form here awaits testing in larger datasets.
11

Source: http://bbs.city.tianya.cn/tianyacity/Content/333/1/15082.shtml.

12

It remains an open question whether the original post was intended straightforwardly as a
“polite” apology or whether this “polite” packaging in fact was also a covert form of
aggression, the so-called “velvet glove” noted by Watts (1992), where aggression is masked
by ostensibly polite formulations.
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